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1. Introduction  
 
A large body of the literature on overeducation has focused on its adverse consequences, 
mainly in terms of wage penalties, the general finding being that the rate of return to 
overschooling is positive but lower than the rate or return to adequate schooling. This wage-
reducing effect appears to have been strikingly consistent over time and across countries
1. In 
contrast, much less consensus has been reached about the main causes of overeducation, and 
especially about the issue of whether it is a temporary or permanent phenomenon. Several 
theories in the literature support the view of the phenomenon being a short-term problem. For 
instance, matching theory (Jovanovic, 1979) suggests that overeducation represents a poor 
match for workers because they are qualified to perform higher-level jobs. Over time, 
however, workers are expected to improve their job match. In the same line, the career 
mobility hypothesis supports that overeducation is part of a career path or insertion process in 
the labour market. According to this view, workers may enter jobs for which they are 
overeducated and later on move to jobs that match better their educational attainments (Groot, 
1996; Groot and Maasen van den Brink, 1997; Sicherman, 1991; Dekker et al., 2002 and 
Büchel and Mertens, 2004). 
 
Other theories consider overeducation as a more serious and long-lasting problem. This 
occurs for instance when the labour market is characterized by imperfect information – 
Spence’s job-screening model – or when the presence of labour market rigidities induces 
workers to occupy jobs for which they are overqualified. In this line, the works of Dolton and 
Vignoles (2000) and Green et al. (2002) provide evidence that family responsibilities and/or 
regional immobility may be some of the reasons behind workers' decisions to voluntarily 
accept jobs for which they are overqualified. In this line, the work of Büchel and Battu (2003) 
shows that married women living in rural areas in Germany are more likely to be 
overeducated, though the gender differential is reduced when commuting times are accounted 
for. The view of overeducation as a form of allocative inefficiency is also supported by the 
assignment model (Sattinger, 1993). Under this approach, educational mismatches arise when 
                                                 
1 Using meta-analysis weighting techniques, Leuven and Oosterbeek (2011) report, in the most recent survey on 
the subject, a return to a year of required schooling of about 9%, whereas a year of overschooling pays-off some 
4.5%.   3
workers are not allocated to jobs in which they have a comparative advantage. Thus, 
overeducation would persist until a more efficient allocation of individuals to jobs could arise, 
through either improved matching processes or government policies intended to reduce such 
inefficiencies. 
 
An alternative explanation of the overeducation phenomenon focuses on the presence of 
unobserved heterogeneity amongst individuals with the same level of qualification. Bauer 
(2002) and Chevalier (2003) argue that overeducation mainly reflects unobserved differences 
in personal characteristics like ability, motivation and other unmeasured skills. Studies that 
consider differences between the unobservables of workers with and without an adequate job 
match are, however, very scarce. Nonetheless, it may be the case that the overeducated have a 
weaker endowment of unobservable characteristics – such as motivation and ability – that 
influence, not only wage determination, but also the risk of remaining in a poor match 
permanently. 
 
In this paper we attempt to shed new light on the main factors driving overeducation. This is 
done in a dynamic perspective based on overeducation exit and entry rates. Our particular 
contributions are two. First, using the 2000-2008 waves of the German Socioeconomic Panel 
(GSOEP), we investigate who is more likely to stay overeducated or enter overeducation, and 
derive measures of state dependence of the process. For this purpose we estimate a first-order 
Markov model that allows us to control for the endogeneity of initial overeducation status 
(non-random selection of people being initially overeducated) and for non-random attrition 
when modelling overeducation transitions. This estimating strategy, novel in the 
overeducation literature, closely resembles Stewart and Swaffield (1999) and Cappellari and 
Jenkins’s (2004) modelling of the dynamics of low income transitions.  
 
Second, the paper gives special emphasis to the role of personality traits when accounting for 
overeducation status. This is motivated by a corpus of recent papers documenting non-trivial 
relationships between non-cognitive skills and labour market outcomes, particularly earnings 
(Heckman et al., 2006, Semykina and Linz, 2007, Mueller and Plug, 2006, Heineck and 
Anger, 2010). Thus, in an attempt to capture individual heterogeneity more explicitly, this 
paper includes personality traits – the Big Five Inventory (BFI) – and locus of control (LOC)   4
measures as potential determinants of overeducation. In doing so, it provides pioneering 
estimates on the relationship between overeducation risk and non-cognitive skills.   
 
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews some papers that analyze the extent 
of overeducation persistence. Section 3 focuses on the relationship between personality traits 
and labour market outcomes. Section 4 describes the data and the definition of overeducation 
used in this study. The econometric approach is described in Section 5. Empirical results are 
reported in Section 6. Section 7 presents the concluding remarks.  
 
2. Overeducation persistence 
 
The presence of state dependence in overeducation is important for policy reasons, as the cost 
of labour market mismatches for individuals depends on both the size of the wage penalty and 
on how long that penalty persists. If evidence emerges of serious mismatch in the labour 
market, with a substantial amount of people failing to obtain jobs that fully utilize their 
qualifications, then the policy of education expansion may need to be reviewed. This would 
be the case if overeducation is the consequence of rigidities and adjustment problems in the 
labour market. In such a case it would lead to serious market inefficiencies – with the excess 
of supply of highly educated workers creating a bumping-down process of highly qualified 
workers into lower qualified jobs, eventually crowding out lower educated workers into 
unemployment. 
 
Although this issue has been recognized in many circumstances, careful and systematic study 
of the dynamics of overeducation has received relatively little attention in the literature, 
principally due to the lack of appropriate longitudinal data. Furthermore, the existing evidence 
is not very conclusive. Some papers provide indirect evidence of substantial state dependence 
in overeducation. For instance, Dolton and Vignoles (2000) use a survey of UK graduates (of 
programs normally requiring three or four years to complete) and find that a significant 
portion of graduates remain overqualified six years after graduation (30%). In the same line, 
Frenette (2004) uses a representative survey of Canadian graduates to explore whether 
overqualification among the highly educated is simply a short-term phenomenon or, in 
contrast, it is a long-term issue for certain graduates. The results show that overqualification is   5
highly state-dependent, with those who are overqualified two years out being far more likely 
to still be overqualified five years out. Finally, Mavromaras et al. (2009) estimate a dynamic 
random effects probit model using the Australia HILDA Survey 2001-2006. They find 
significant evidence of state dependence in overeducation, which is especially high for 
individuals with higher levels of education. 
 
Other works have showed, in contrast, that overeducation mobility is relatively high. For 
instance,  Groot and Maassen van den Brink (2004) use a longitudinal sample from the 
Netherlands to examine the determinants of overeducation entries and exits. They account for 
unobserved heterogeneity by estimating random effects probit models. At the same time, 
transitions in and out of overeducation are estimated with a Markov type model (fixed 
effects), putting special attention to the role of job mobility – distinguishing between job-to-
job mobility and internal mobility. They find that job-to-job mobility increases the probability 
of exiting from overeducation, while internal mobility increases the risk of becoming 
overeducated. In the same line, Lindley and McIntosh (2010) use the British Household Panel 
Survey (1991-2005) to estimate the determinants of transitions out of overeducation in the 
UK. They find that the likelihood of overeducation is negatively related to job tenure, 
suggesting that overeducation is mostly a temporary phenomenon. However, for a minority of 
individuals it seems to be a reasonably permanent state.   
 
In this paper we examine overeducation persistence and its main determinants using a 
trivariate probit model. This type of model allows us to take account of the fact that the set of 
individuals at risk of exiting overeducation, or the set at risk of entering overeducation, may 
not be a random sample of the population, an example of an ‘initial conditions’ problem 
(Heckman, 1981). At the same time, our estimates of overeducation transitions control for 
potentially non-random selection into the subsample of individuals who are observed in two 
consecutive years. This type of multivariate models has been used in studies of earnings 
mobility (Stewart and Swaffield, 1999; and Cappellari and Jenkins, 2004) and studies on 
employment transitions (Cappellari and Jenkins, 2008; Cappellari et al., 2010). However, and 
to the best of our knowledge, this type of technique has not been applied to analyze 
overeducation dynamics. This is precisely one of the main purposes of the paper.   
   6
3. The role of personality traits 
 
In a comprehensive survey, Almlund et al. (2011) document important relationships between 
personality and a variety of life outcomes, including health, criminal activity, economic 
success and labour market outcomes. Organizational and industrial psychologists have shown 
that apart from job performance (see Barrick and Mount, 1991, for a meta-analysis and, more 
recently, Judge at al., 2007), personality is related in meaningful ways to job satisfaction 
(Judge et al., 2002) and career success (Kammeyer-Mueller et al., 2008).  
 
The evidence is suggestive of many channels driving these relationships. Personality might be 
thought of as part of an individual's set of productive traits just as general or specific 
education or job-related training. In this context, some personality traits are expected to be 
rewarded in the labour market, while others are expected to be punished. Bowles et al. (2001) 
suggest that non-cognitive personality variables, such as attitudes towards risk, ability to 
adapt to new economic conditions, hard work, and the rate of time preference affect both 
earnings and the transmission of economic status across generations. Mueller and Plug (2006) 
use US data to estimate traditional Mincerian wage equations based on the human capital 
model extended to incorporate the Big Five Inventory of personality. Even though the overall 
contribution of these in explaining the variance in earnings is typically found to be modest, 
some relevant effects have been established. Substantial earnings disadvantages are associated 
with Agreeableness and Neuroticism, whereas Openness to experience is positively related to 
earnings. Overall, they find that non-cognitive abilities have effects comparable to those 
commonly found for cognitive ability. In Heckman et al. (2006) achievement test scores 
explain much more of the earnings variance but have similar effects on labour market 
outcomes as the measures of personality traits. Using pooled Dutch data, Nyhus and Pons 
(2005) find negative earnings effects for Agreeableness and Neuroticism. Their study 
documents diverging personality effects by education level, with the effects of Agreeableness 
and Neuroticism being larger and smaller, respectively, among university graduates. Heckman 
et al. (2006) and Semykina and Linz (2007) detect relevant effects of external LOC on 
earnings, although the later study primarily focuses on explaining male-female earnings 
differentials. In the same line, Heineck and Anger (2010) find that workers who score in the 
bottom 25% of the LOC scale are exposed to a wage penalty of up to 20% compared to   7
workers who score in the top 25% of the scale. In their setting, these effects are twice as large 
as the effects of workers' cognitive abilities.  
 
Several explanations can be put forward to account for these relationships. Personality may 
affect labour market success indirectly through the type of occupation chosen. Judge et al. 
(1999) document non-trivial interactions between specific personality traits and occupational 
attainment across the life span. This evidence is well in line with sorting theories suggesting 
that some of the five personality dimensions may predict “extrinsic” career success if 
personality traits fit the psychological requirements of the job. Conscientiousness (Ham et al. 
2009) and LOC (Heckman et al., 2006) predict sorting into occupations. Similarly, personality 
may be intertwined with the individual education path. Heckman et al. (2010) estimate a 
model of sequential educational choice and find that personality, as measured by participation 
in adolescent risky behaviours, primarily affects age 30 earnings through its effects on 
education. Still, they find that for a given educational attainment the effects of personality 
variables on outcomes are weak. In Borghans et al. (2011) substantial portions of the variance 
in achievement test scores and grades, which are often used as measures of cognition, are 
explained by personality variables.  
 
Other mechanisms might be the mediating role that personality exerts on absenteeism 
(Störmer and Fahr, 2010), the likelihood of self-employment (Caliendo et al., 2008) and 
unemployment duration (Caliendo et al., 2010). Dohmen at al. (2009) highlight the role of 
reciprocity in generating better labour market prospects by showing that reciprocal workers 
are paid more, exert greater effort on the job, are more likely to be employed and report 
higher life satisfaction. Moreover, in a bargaining model context, personality differences may 
lead to differences in pay if certain traits tend to concede too quickly.  
 
In sum, there is an emerging literature concerned with assessing and providing explanations 
for the conspicuous relationship between personality and labour market outcomes. One of the 
contributions of this paper is to extend the debate to the realm of educational mismatches and, 
more specifically, overeducation. To the extent that the incidence of overeducation has 
important implications for earnings and job satisfaction, this purpose is interesting in itself. 
Moreover, overeducation may exert a mediating role in the empirical relationships   8
documented so far. Although assessing this role is not the object of the present investigation, 
the results presented here represent a preliminary step.  
 
 
4. Data and measurement of overeducation 
 
Conducted in Germany since 1984, the GSOEP is a wide-ranging representative longitudinal 
study of households that contains a large set of personal, family and labour market 
characteristics of household members. The unit of analysis in the present paper are 
individuals. After dropping observations with missing values in the relevant variables we 
retain 71,321 observations. 
 
Workers are classified as either adequately educated or overeducated according to a statistical 
approach based on the ISCO88 classification disaggregated on a 3-digit level. Required 
schooling is defined as a one standard deviation range around the mean level of schooling 
within an occupation. Workers are considered to be adequately educated if their actual 
education falls within this range and overeducated if their actual education is greater than one 
standard deviation above the mean for the specific occupation. Occupations with less than 10 
observations in a year are excluded from the analysis. Alternative definitions with modal 
value and 2-digit occupations were also examined.  
 
Table 1 contains the summary statistics of the estimating sample. The proportion of 
overeducated workers amounts to 14.4%
2. The average educational attainment is 12.5 years of 
schooling. Tenure amounts to 11.2 years on average, with 26.7% of the sample having a 
temporary contract. 14.7% of the workers are self-employed and women account for 46.4% of 
the sample. Most individuals are married or live with a partner (67.5%), albeit a significant 
fraction is single (23.6%). Finally, 9.8% of the respondents declare that they have a “bad” or 
“very bad” health condition. In the regression stage, the continuous variables (age, years of 
completed education, tenure, number of children and adults at home) are entered in their 
                                                 
2 This prevalence rate is towards the bottom range of the bunch of estimates reported in the literature. Using the modal value 
instead of the average years of schooling within occupations results into 26% of the sample being overeducated, a figure that 
comes closer to standards. We disregarded this alternative measurement method because empirically it results in a less 
demanding criterion for the definition of overeducation.    9
logarithm form.  
 
4.1. Personality traits 
 
All the items included in the Big Five Inventory, as well as the LOC and reciprocity items are 
to be answered on 7-point Likert type scales (1 — “disagree completely” (LOC)/“does not 
apply to me at all” (BFI) to 7 — “agree completely” (LOC)/“applies to me perfectly” (BFI)). 
The BFI represents a widely accepted approach to conceptualizing personality, as meta-
analyses consistently support the construct validity of this approach (Costa and McCrae, 
1992). After aggregating across items, the BFI provides a score for the five major traits that 
define human personality across cultures: Conscientiousness, a tendency to be organized, 
strong-willed, persistent, reliable, and a follower of rules and ethical principles; Neuroticism, 
the tendency to experience negative emotions such as anxiety and depression; Extraversion, 
the tendency to be sociable, warm, active, assertive, cheerful, and in search of stimulation; 
Agreeableness, the dimension of interpersonal relations, characterized by altruism, trust, 
modesty, and cooperativeness; and Openness to experience, the tendency to be imaginative, 
creative, unconventional, emotionally and artistically sensitive. Each of these factors is 
hierarchically defined by specific facets. The BFI questionnaire used in the 2005 wave of the 
GSOEP is based on 3 items per personality dimension. Despite psychologists typically work 
with longer questionnaires, the shortened version used in this paper, known as the BFI-S, has 
been validated against longer inventories
3. A further issue in personality measures is the 
concern that variability in the resulting scores arise from measurement error. In our data, 
encompassing tests of internal consistency were satisfactory
4.  
                                                 
3 The BFI-S items are: I see myself as someone who… i) worries a lot, ii) gets nervous easily, iii) is relaxed, handles stress 
well; iv) is communicative, talkative, v) is outgoing, sociable, vi) is reserved; vii) is original, comes up with new ideas, viii) 
values artistic experiences, ix) has an active imagination; x) is sometimes somewhat rude to others, xi) has a forgiving nature, 
xii) is considerate and kind to others; xiii) does a thorough job, xiv) does things effectively and efficiently, xv) tends to be 
lazy. Neuroticism: i)-iii), Extraversion: iv)-vi), Openness to experience: vii)-ix), Agreeableness: x)-xii), Conscientiousness: 
xiii)-xv). By construction, the score in a given dimension ranges from a minimum of 3 to a maximum of 21.   
4 A principal component analysis with varimax rotation was conducted. Factor analyses clearly replicated the Big Five factors 
by yielding a correlation matrix with five eigenvalues above unity. The five principal components accounted for 60.7% of the 
total variance. The Cronbach’s alphas for the five dimensions were 0.607, 0.657, 0.625, 0.505 and 0.609, respectively. It 
must be noticed that for a given level of internal consistency, fewer items per dimension result into lower alphas (Mueller and   10
Locus of control (LOC) is measured externally and internally. People with an external LOC 
believe that his/her behaviour is guided by fate, luck, or other external circumstances, while 
those with an internal LOC believe that his/her behaviour is guided by his/her personal 
decisions and efforts. Within psychology, LOC is considered to be an important aspect of 
personality and, more importantly, the extent to which one finds social comparisons inspiring 
or threatening is known in the field of psychology to depend on whether one finds a sense of 
control over the dimension under evaluation (Lockwood, 2002). In the GSOEP, LOC is 
surveyed with 10 items of which four relate to internal and the other six measure external 
LOC
5. Unfortunately, internal LOC was found to exhibit a very limited amount of construct 
validity in the data
6, meaning that the surveyed items are not at all appropriate for measuring 
the underlying scale. This forced us to excluded internal LOC from the analyses. 
 
The average scores (in a 1-7 scale) of the different personality dimensions are reported in 
Table 2. In the regressions stage of the paper, these were normalized to a mean zero and unit 
variance. Figure 1 shows the density function of the normalized scores. The graphs show that 
only a few of the traits are not normally distributed, namely Conscientiousness and 
Agreeableness, which are left-skewed. As a final remark, the BFI and LOC information 
gathered in the 2005 wave of the GSOEP were not surveyed in any of the previous or 
subsequent years. To deal with this limitation, it is assumed thorough the paper that these 





                                                                                                                                                          
Plug, 2006). Hence, although these reliability coefficients are towards the lower range of admissible values, they point to a 
reasonable amount of internal consistency given the low (3) number of items per personality traits. 
5 These are: i) My life course depends on me, ii) Influence on social conditions through involvement, iii) Success takes hard 
work, iv) Doubt my abilities when problems arise; v) Haven’t achieved what I deserve, vi) What you achieve depends on 
luck, vii) Others make the crucial decisions in my life; viii) Possibilities are defined by social conditions; ix) Abilities are 
more important than effort; x) Little control over my life. Internal LOC measured by i)-iv). External LOC measured by v)-x).  
6 The alpha reliability coefficient was as low as 0.201. 
7 This should not be seen as a stringent assumption, as it is generally accepted that adult’s personality traits are fairly stable 
over time (Roberts and Del Vecchio, 2000, Costa and McCrae, 2002). In our sample, the respondents mean age is 41.5 years 
and they are interviewed during no more than 7 consecutive years, so that the potential interdependency between early life 
events and personality should not matter much.   11
4.2 Overeducation transitions 
 
An informative way of looking at movements into and out of overeducation is in terms of 
conditional probabilities. Restricting the attention to employed individuals, Table 3 shows the 
probabilities of being overeducated in year t given an individual’s state – either overeducated 
or not – at   1 . The transitions are pooled over the period 2000-2008. 
 
As it can be observed, the likelihood of being overeducated in a given year differs 
substantially depending on overeducation status in the previous year. The persistence rate is 
remarkably large, with only 13.6% of workers exiting from mismatched jobs in a given year, 
whereas only 2.0% of those who were not overeducated one year are overeducated the 
following year. In other words, the next year’s overeducation risk among the overeducated is 
as much as 84.4 percentage points (pp) higher than for those who are not overeducated. A 
second aspect that should be taken into consideration when analysing transitions is the high 
and non-ignorable attrition problem that most panel surveys frequently suffer. As other 
longitudinal data, the GSOEP surveys not only the original sample from the first wave, but 
also households and persons that entered the survey at later points in time. While the original 
sample members are augmented with the entrance of new members, there are other 
households that leave the survey for several reasons: survey-related reasons (unsuccessful 
follow-up and refusal) and reasons unrelated to the survey (moves abroad and deaths). The 
“Missing” column in Table 3 reveals that a non-trivial proportion of the sample used in this 
study were not retained from one year to the next. Furthermore, the retention rates slightly 
vary between those who were initially overeducated (15.8%) and those who were not 
(17.1%). 
 
The descriptive analysis provides preliminary evidence of a strong state dependence effect in 
the dynamics of overeducation. Broadly speaking, state dependence is defined as the degree to 
which the effect of any initial endowment (often referred to as individual characteristics) on 
an outcome may be attenuated or accentuated by the continued presence of that outcome. 
However, it does not necessarily imply that this state dependence, observed in aggregate 
terms, is true at the individual level. It may be the result of heterogeneity, where certain 
individual characteristics increase the probability of being overeducated. This would create   12
the appearance of state dependence in the aggregate transition probabilities if some of the 
relevant characteristics exhibit persistence over time (e.g. education). Alternatively, or in 
addition, there may be ‘true’, or structural, state dependence for individuals. That would be 
the case if being overeducated in one period increases in itself the probability of being over-
educated in the next period, even relative to another individual with identical characteristics 
who was not overeducated at the previous period. Distinguishing between omitted 
heterogeneity and structural state dependence is of paramount importance: while state 
dependence due to heterogeneity can be influenced by changing individual characteristics, 
structural state dependence may be harder to tackle. Although addressing this issue is difficult 
– it requires additional information, such as the availability of suitable instruments – this 
distinction must be explicitly modelled in the estimating framework for the correct 
understanding of outcomes that persist over time. This is precisely described in the next 
section. 
 
5. The econometric approach 
 
This section considers the modelling of transitions into and out of overeducation. Hazard 
regressions models have been commonly used in the literature to study dynamics in different 
fields, such as employment and poverty. Generally, in this type of models unobserved factors 
are assumed to be independent of entry to the state, and the problem of attrition is commonly 
ignored.  
 
However, when modelling transition probabilities, it is important that the ‘initial conditions’ 
problem is addressed (Heckman, 1981). It can be viewed as an endogenous selection problem: 
unobserved factors affecting transitions between states may be correlated with factors 
determining the original state. At the same time, one of the potentially most damaging effects 
on the value of panel data is the presence of biasing attrition, i.e. attrition selectively related to 
outcome variables of interest. As Atkinson and Micklewright (1991) point out, even a loss of 
5% of the sample each year will eventually have a substantial cumulative impact on the 
proportion of the original sample remaining in the panel. If attrition bias is selective and 
concentrated among certain types of individuals, it may lead to biased estimations. 
   13
5.1 The model 
 
We consider a sample of individuals in employment situation at period   1 . The risk of 
overeducation can be written in terms of an unobserved latent overeducation propensity      
    
which is a linear function of observable characteristics plus an error term normally 
distributed: 
 
                                                 
                   ,             0,1                                          (1)        
 
where i=1….N indexes individuals,       is the vector of explanatory variables that includes 
personal, household and job characteristics, and       is an error term that can be written as 
the sum of an individual-specific component plus an orthogonal white noise error:        
          . Let                
   0   be a dummy variable indicating whether the individual   
is over-educated in year   1 , where the indicator function      equals one if its argument 
holds, and zero otherwise.  
 
Transitions into and out of overeducation are only possible if the individuals are also observed 
in period t. We denote     
  as the sample retention propensity between years   1  and  : 
 
                                                 
                 ,         0,1                                                    2  
 
where       is a vector of explanatory factors, and the error term                is the sum of a 
normal individual component,   , plus a normal orthogonal white noise,    . Let      
     
   0   be a binary indicator of permanence in the sample for each individual.  
 
The third component to be specified is that characterising overeducation status in period  , 
which is observed only if       1 . Let the latent propensity of overeducation be characterized 
by: 
 
                                   
            
     1          
             ,           0,1                          3  
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where the vectors   ,    and       are column vectors, and the error term     is the sum of an 
individual specific effect plus an orthogonal white noise:               . We define an 
indicator variable            
   0    for overeducation in year  . This specification allows the 
impact of explanatory variables on current overeducation to differ according to the individual 
status in the previous period. Thus, Eq. (3) allows us to examine the conditional probability of 
the event and, therefore, overeducation transitions
8.  
 
Finally, we allow the unobservable factors in Eqs. (1)-(3) to be jointly distributed as a 
trivariate normal with zero means, unit variances, and the following three unrestricted 
correlations: 
                  ,                 ,     
                                                                      ,                 ,                                               (4) 
                ,                ,     
 
Thus, the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity is parameterized via the cross-equation 
correlations. Correlation    summarizes the association between unobserved individual 
specific factors determining base year overeducation status and sample retention. A positive 
(negative) value of this correlation term indicates that individuals who were more likely to be 
initially overeducated are more (less) likely to be in the sample next year. The correlation 
between unobserved factors affecting both current and previous overeducation status is 
captured by   . A positive (negative) sign indicates that individual who were more likely to 
be initially overeducated are more (less) likely to remain overeducated one year after, 
compared to those who were initially non-overeducated. Finally,    is the correlation between 
unobserved individual specific factors determining retention propensities and current status.  
 
5.2 Overeducation transition probabilities 
 
Our main interest is on overeducation transition probabilities. The estimation of a trivariate 
probit allows us to predict the probability of being overeducated at   conditional on being 
                                                 
8 A more complex analysis would estimate a simultaneous model including another equation for educational achievement, 
insofar as it may be related to personality traits. Unfortunately, the resulting model would be cumbersome and require 
additional instruments that render the analysis unfeasible with the available data.   15
overeducated at   1  (the overeducation persistence rate), and the probability of being 
overeducated at   conditional on being non-overeducated at   1  (the overeducation entry 
rate). These probabilities are characterized by the following expressions: 
 
                                            1 |         1    
Φ    
′     , ′     ;    
Φ  ′      
                            (5) 
                                           1 |         0    
Φ    
      ,        ;     
Φ          
                       (6) 
 
where Φ and Φ  are, respectively, the univariate and bivariate standard normal cumulative 
distribution functions. A feature of first-order Markov models is that they provide closed-form 
solutions for the spell duration of the phenomenon under consideration. It can be shown that, 
in our case, the mean duration of an overeducation spell is given by 1/ 1      , where 
 1        defines the overeducation exit rate, whereas 1/      represents the mean duration 
of a non-overeducation spell. Finally, it is worth noting that while the aggregate transitions 
represented in Table 3 only refer to the subsample with      1 ,     the transitions probabilities 
of Eqs. (5) and (6) are estimated also for the subsample of individuals who are not observed in 
year   (those with      0 ). 
 
5.3 The likelihood function 
 
The trivariate probit regression model includes an endogenous dummy variable (lagged 
overeducation), endogenous switching (in year   equations), and endogenous selection (of 
year    equations with respect to attrition). Thus, the likelihood function involves normal 
integrals of various dimensions, the largest being three. The contribution to the log-likelihood 
for each individual   with overeducation status observed in period   1  is: 
 
                 log Φ      
      ,          ,          ;       ,       ,          
  1            log Φ      
      ,          ,          ;       ,       ,          
  1      log Φ           ,          ;          
 
where     2       1 ,      2       1 ,     2         1    16
The estimation of the model requires evaluation of multivariate normal probability 
distribution functions. Our sample data consists of repeated observations on the same 
individual across successive periods of time. These repeated observations mean that the i.i.d. 
assumption is violated. To account for this we use a pseudo maximum likelihood estimator 
(PSML). There are methods in the statistics literature that allow for arbitrary correlations 
between observations within the same sample cluster (Huber, 1967; and Binder, 1983). In 
such methods, the sample log-likelihood is a “pseudo-likelihood” (Gourieroux and Monfort, 
1996), from which a robust variance estimator of the parameter estimates can be derived using 
Taylor-series linearization. Thus, we evaluate the trivariate standard normal distribution 
function using simulation methods based on the Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane (GHK) 
simulator with 250 random draws.
9 
 
5.4 The covariates 
 
We consider personal, demographic and job characteristics as the main determinants of 
overeducation. This includes gender, age, marital status, education, health status, variables 
referring to household composition (number of adults and children at home) and job 
characteristics (type of contract and job tenure). The main novelty in this respect is the 
inclusion of explicit controls for the respondent’s personality traits as measured by the BFI 
and LOC constructs described above. This refinement is intended to capture individual 
heterogeneity more explicitly and to provide pioneering estimates of the impact that 
personality exerts on the likelihood of (entering and exiting) overeducation. To account for 
education-related specific effects of personality, these indicators are interacted with the 
individual level of schooling. All equations include year fixed effects. 
 
All covariates in the Eq. (3) were measured using their values at year   1 .  Identification of 
the model requires some exclusion restrictions. First, we require variables that affect initial 
overeducation status and retention while having no effect on transitions, i.e., variables 
entering the       or        vectors but not      . As instrument for sample retention we 
                                                 
9 The GHK simulator works by taking draws from upper truncated univariate standard normal distributions, and then 
recursively computing a multivariate probability value using Cholesky’s factorization.  For maximization, we use the 
modified Gauss-Newton routine implemented by Stata’s ml command jointly with a cluster option to provide robust 
estimators.   17
include a binary variable indicating whether the individual was a GSOEP original sample 
member. With this identifying restriction we assume that these individuals are more stable 
survey members compared to joiners, and that sample membership status is orthogonal to the 
overeducation transition propensity. Thus, vector       includes all the variables in       plus 
the original panel member indicator. Two set of instruments were explored for base year 
overeducation. The first set referred to the respondent’s parental socioeconomic background 
as measured by the parent’s occupation when the respondent was aged between 14 and 15. 
These variables have been previously found to have a significant effect on the probability of 
having a poor labour market status as measured by low pay (Stewart and Swaffield, 1999, 
Cappellari and Jenkins, 2004). Unfortunately, the validity of these instruments was not 
supported by our data. As an alternative, we use the respondent’s quality of relationship with 
parents. In particular, vector       contains all variables included in       plus a set of 12 
binary variables, including variables to indicate missing information, describing the frequency 
(ranging from “very often” to “never”) of unpleasant arguments and fights with father and 
mother when the individual was between 14 and 15 years old. The assumption being made 
here is that a poor relationship positively affects the likelihood of initial overeducation, 




For expositional purposes, the discussion of the results is done in four stages. Firstly, we 
report on the estimated correlation between the unobservable component of the three 
equations and the encompassing exogeneity tests. Secondly, we concentrate on the effects of 
the explanatory variables on the overeducation transitions. Thirdly, we assess the extent of 
state dependence, differentiate between individual or ‘true’ state dependence and aggregate 
state dependence. Finally, we move on to explore the role of individual heterogeneity in 
explaining overeducation persistence, giving special attention to respondents’ non-cognitive 
skills. 
 
6.1 Testing the model specification 
In order to assess the exogeneity of both initial conditions and sample retention, we test for 
the separate and joint significance of the correlation coefficients associated with the two   18
selection equations. Table  4 reports the estimated correlation structure of the unobserved 
factors jointly with the tests of ignorability of attrition and initial conditions.  
 
The correlation between unobservables affecting retention and initial overeducation (    is 
negative, indicating a lower retention propensity among the initially overeducated relative to 
the non-overeducated. Still, this statistic fails to be significant at conventional levels. More 
interestingly, the correlation between unobservables affecting initial overeducation and 
conditional current overeducation status (    is positive and statistically significant. This 
supports the existence of unobserved factors that are positively related to the likelihood of 
being initially overeducated and, at the same time, increase the risk of overeducation 
persistence. As for the correlation between retention and transitions (   , the coefficient is 
positive but imprecisely estimated.  
 
Exogeneity of initial conditions would imply that    and    are jointly zero, but such a 
hypothesis is strongly rejected (Wald test     0.000). On the other hand, exogeneity of 
retention would imply          0 . In this case, the null hypothesis is not rejected, a result 
that is unsurprising given that    and    are imprecisely estimated. Finally, the test of joint 
significance of the three correlation coefficients indicates that they are jointly significant with 
a p-value of 0.000 or, to put it differently, that the two endogenous selection processes cannot 
be ignored when describing the dynamics into and out of overeducation. Still, inspection of 
the pair-wise tests warns that endogeneity operates mainly via a correlation with initial 
conditions. 
 
Regarding the validity of the instruments, the results of Table 4 show that the relationship 
quality with parents and sample membership variables can be excluded from the transition 
equation separately (p-values of 0.166 and 0.218, respectively) and jointly (p-value = 0.178). 
On the other hand, the relationship variables are jointly highly significant (p-value = 0.034) in 
     , whereas original panel membership is a relevant covariate for retention (p-value = 
0.000). Thus, according to the tests for inclusion, the validity of the proposed instruments is 
supported by the data. 
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6.2. The effect of explanatory variables on transition probabilities 
 
Table 5 reports the maximum likelihood estimates for the variables in      , discriminating 
between the determinants of overeducation persistence (first column) and the determinants of 
overeducation entry (second column).
10 According to the test reported in the last row of the 
table, the equality of the two set of estimates           0 ) is strongly rejected. Thus, there is 
a statistically relevant state dependence effect, according to which initial overeducation 
condition importantly determines the respondent’s next period status.   
 
As expected, the dimension most closely related to overeducation is attained schooling. More 
educated individuals are significantly more likely to be overeducated, and this occurs 
regardless of their status at   1 . However, this is not the general pattern. Most variables 
exert a differential effect depending on whether the individual was initially overeducated or 
not. This is the case of singlehood, which significantly reduces the probability of 
overeducation persistence (-0.161) while rendering the probability of overeducation entry 
unaltered (t-ratio = 0.75). The role of gender is exactly the opposite: women are less likely to 
enter overeducation (-0.095) but as likely as men to remain overeducated (t-ratio = -0.03). 
 
Interestingly, we detect some differences in the dynamics of overeducation by personality 
groups. Specifically, we find that scoring high in Conscientiousness, Extraversion and 
external LOC, and scoring low in Openness significantly decreases the probability of 
remaining overeducated. Interestingly, the impact of these personality traits is strongly 
moderated by the individual level of schooling. The interaction terms between schooling, 
Conscientiousness, Extraversion and external LOC are significant at conventional levels and 
indicate that personality differences are relatively less important when accounting for 
overeducation persistence among the high educated. Among the non-overeducated at   1  
(second column), Conscientiousness an Extraversion are less relevant dimensions, whereas 
the beneficial effects of external LOC on the probability of overeducation are higher by a 
factor of almost 2 (-0.0761 against -1.265). Among this group, the role of personality 
differences is also significantly moderated by schooling levels.  
                                                 
10 The estimates for initial overeducation and retention are available from the authors upon request. 
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As for the remaining variables, a higher number of adults in the household significantly raises 
the probability of remaining overeducated, while it leaves the probability of entering 
overeducation practically unaltered. Similarly, the self-employed are more likely to remain 
overeducated, while they are as likely to enter overeducation as the remaining workers. 
Having a temporary contract, by contrast, has a positive effect on the entry probability and a 
non-significant effect on the likelihood of overeducation persistence. Similarly, the beneficial 
effects of tenure on the overeducation probability are more conspicuous among the non-
overeducated at   1 .  
 
6.3 State dependence  
 
This section is aimed at disentangling the puzzle of the main forces causing overeducation 
persistence. First, we address the question of how much state dependence there is in the 
conditional probability of remaining overeducated. The probabilities being considered above 
are aggregate probabilities. They do not necessarily imply that this state dependence observed 
in aggregate holds at the individual level. If certain individual characteristics increase the 
probability of an individual remaining overeducated, then observed state dependence may be 
the result of heterogeneity: if some of these characteristics exhibit persistence over time (e.g. 
education), this will create the appearance of state dependence in the aggregate transition 
probabilities even if such an effect is absent in individual transition probabilities 
 
In addition, there may be individual state dependence: being overeducated in one period may 
in itself increase the probability of being overeducated in the next period, even relative to 
another individual with identical characteristics who was not overeducated in the first period. 
That would be the case, for example, if a spell of overeducation negatively affects an 
individual's perception of his market value and discourages him from applying for jobs 
commensurate with his level of education. Similarly, holding a mismatched job may alter 
workers' preferences or motivations in such a way as to make them more likely to remain in 
that segment of the labour market. This would be particularly the case if the mismatched 
status comes in exchange of other forms of compensation (commuting time, human capital 
accumulation, flexibility). A third explanation has to do with human capital losses: having 
excess education may cause the depreciation of human capital not currently being used,   21
thereby keeping an individual's productivity low and reducing the probability of achieving a 
good match in the future.  
 
The calculations needed to assess the extent of aggregate against individual state dependence 
are reported in Table 6. Following Stewart and Swaffield (1999), for each individual we 
calculate the predicted conditional probability of being overeducated at   given being 
overeducated at   1  (Eq. (5)). These are then averaged over first those overeducated at 
  1  and then those non overeducated at   1 . The resulting figures, 0.862 and 0.169, 
respectively, are reported in rows 4 and 5 of the table. The difference between the two figures, 
immediately below (0.694), is the contribution that is not due to state dependence, insofar as 
these probabilities are conditional on an identical overeducation condition for both groups of 
individuals.  
 
The state dependence effect is then calculated as the difference between the average 
probability of being overeducated at   conditional on being overeducated at   1  over the 
sample who were non-overeducated at   1  (0.169), and the raw aggregate probability of 
being over-educated at t over the same sample (0.020). This gap is due to differences in the 
initial overeducation status among otherwise similar individuals and, as such, it captures the 
extent of individual state dependence. According to the estimates, being initially overeducated 
increases in itself the risk of remaining over-educated in the next period. Still, the contribution 
of individual state dependence in the estimated models is moderate, with 17.6% of the 
difference in aggregate probabilities being due to the fact of having been overeducated at 
  1 , holding characteristics fixed.  
 
6.4 Individual heterogeneity: the role of personality 
 
This section complements the analysis by exploring the role of personality traits in explaining 
overeducation persistence and entry rates, as well as average and median lengths of time spent 
in and out of overeducation. The magnitude of the differential between mean and medians 
captures the degree of dispersion in spell lengths among individuals with identical observable 
characteristics. 
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We proceed as follows. First, we replace       in (1) by its mean over the subsample of 
overeducated individuals, and we compute the predicted probability of either remaining 
overeducated at period   – the persistence rate – and the predicted probability of entering 
overeducation – the entry rate. Taking this as the reference outcome, we then compute the 
same probabilities augmenting the corresponding value of each dimension of personality by 1 
standard deviation, while holding the rest of covariates fixed at their mean values. The 
difference between these two probabilities captures the impact of the BFI and external LOC 
variables on overeducation transitions. Furthermore, and in order to account for the relative 
importance of personality, we compute the same difference in probabilities when years of 
schooling are increased by 1 standard deviation. Finally, we describe the joint effect of 
changes in schooling and personality.  
 
The results are reported in Table 7. For the reference overeducated individual, the probability 
of remaining overeducated is 89.2%, whereas the probability of entering overeducation is 
53.8%. These figures imply a state probability of overeducation of 83.3%, a mean (median) 
overeducation spell of 9.3 (6.1) years and mean (median) time between overeducation spells 
of 1.9 (0.9) years. As it can be observed, the probability of remaining overeducated increases 
by 5.5 pp when we simulate an increase of 1 standard deviation in average years of schooling. 
The impact on the entry rate is even larger (26.0 pp). These impacts are remarkable and 
highlight the close relationship between attained schooling and overeducation status. The 
close relationship between personality traits and overeducation is perhaps more surprising. A 
1 standard deviation increase in Conscientiousness decreases the persistence and entry rates 
by 10.5 and 31.0 pp, respectively, relative to the reference individual, resulting in 46.5 pp 
shorter overeducation spells (4.95 against 9.26 years). An identical change in Extraversion 
results into even lower persistence and entry rates (-13.9 and -38.3 pp, respectively, relative to 
the reference individual), shorter average overeducation spells (-53.5 pp) and longer non-
overeducation spells (62.1 pp). Despite to a lower extent, scoring high on External LOC has 
also a beneficial effect on the overeducation risk. By contrast, Neuroticism, Agreeableness 
and, especially, Openness are associated with higher overeducation risks. This is mainly due 
to sensitive increases in the corresponding entry rates, which are between 5.0 and 51.5 pp 
above that of the reference individual, while differences in persistence rates are much smaller.  
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All in all, the results show that personality differences play an important role in explaining 
overeducation transitions, being especially responsible for large differences in the 
overeducation entry rate. In the last rows of Table 7 we consider simultaneous changes in 
education and personality traits. This is done by reporting variations in probabilities following 
a 1 standard deviation increase in the schooling level and  a similar increase in a given 
personality trait. There is a non-trivial interaction between schooling and personality, as 
suggested in the previous sections. For example, being above average in terms of schooling 
and Conscientiousness does not result in a higher overeducation risk relative to the reference 
individual. The corresponding statistics are indeed very close, with persistence and entry rates 
2.0 and 3.2 pp lower, respectively, than that of the reference individual. This result suggests 
that a particular personality trait – Conscientiousness – may more than offset the effects of 
attained schooling on the risk of overeducation.  This is also the case of Extraversion and, to a 
lower extent, external LOC. By contrast, the 10.5 pp higher state probability of overeducation 
among the more educated is barely affected by a higher score in Neuroticism (11.6 p) and 
Agreeableness (12.4 pp). Finally, the simultaneous effect of schooling and Openness on the 
overeducation risk is indeed lower than the sum of the independent effect of these variables.  
 
A final lesson from Table 7 is that entry rates exhibit a greater amount of individual 
heterogeneity than persistence rates. This suggest that a substantial part of the variation in the 
state probability of overeducation is due to differences in the overeducation spell duration and 
not to differences in the lengths of time spent out of overeducation. The last column in the 
table shows that absolute differences in the latter case are relatively modest.  
 
7. Concluding remarks 
 
Using the 2000-2008 waves of the German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP), this paper shows 
that structural state dependence in overeducation is moderate. This was done estimating a 
first-order Markov models that allows us to control for the endogeneity of initial 
overeducation status (non-random selection of people being initially overeducated) and for 
non-random attrition.  
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The estimation of conditional probabilities shows that there appears to be substantial 
heterogeneity in the rates of movement into and out of overeducation. Apart from the effect of 
personal, demographic and job characteristics, our results reveal that overeducation dynamics 
are significantly influenced by personality traits. In this respect, the paper contributes to the 
emerging literature that relates non-cognitive skills with labour market outcomes. In 
particular, we find that some dimensions of personality like Conscientiousness, Extraversion 
and external LOC exert a higher impact on overeducation transitions – especially regarding 
entry rates – than that caused by attained schooling. This result is in line with other works in 
the literature suggesting that overeducation mainly reflects unobserved differences in personal 
characteristics like ability or motivation.  
 
Notwithstanding the substantial differences in overeducation transitions associated with 
individual heterogeneity, the results uncover a non-trivial state dependence in overeducation. 
In particular, we find that 17.6% of the observed persistence in overeducation is due to the 
fact of having been overeducated in the previous year, holding characteristics fixed. This 
implies that a non negligible amount of overeducated people fails to move to more adequate 
jobs regardless of their personal characteristics, including non-cognitive skills. This 
observation is supportive of the view that rigidities and/or adjustment problems in the labour 
market make overeducation a serious and long-lasting problem. Tackling against educational 












   25
References  
 
Almlund, M., A.L. Duckworth, J.J. Heckman and Kautz, T.D. 2011. Personality Psychology 
and Economics, NBER Working Papers 16822, National Bureau of Economic Research, 
Inc. 
Atkinson, A.B. and J. Micklewright. 1991. Unemployment Compensation and Labour Market 
Transitions: A Critical Review. Journal of Economic Literature 29: 1679-1727. 
Barrick, M.R and M.K. Mount. 1991. The Big Five Personality Dimensions and Job 
Performance: A Meta-Analysis. Personnel Psychology 44(1): 1-26. 
Bauer, T. 2002. Educational mismatch and wages: a panel analysis. Economics of Education 
Review, 21(3): 221–229. 
Binder, D.A. 1983. On the variances of asymptotically normal estimators from complex 
surveys. International Statistical Review 51: 279-292. 
Borghans, L., B. Golsteyn, J.J Heckman and J.E Humphries. 2011. Identification Problems in 
Personality Psychology. IZA Discussion Paper 5605. 
Bowles, S., H. Gintis, Herbert and M. Osborne. 2001. The Determinants of Earnings: A 
Behavioral Approach. Journal of Economic Literature 39(4): 1137-1176. 
Büchel, F., and H. Battu. 2003. The theory of differential overqualification: does it work? 
Scottish Journal of Political Economy 50: 1-16. 
Büchel, F. and A. Mertens. 2004. Overeducation, Undereducation, and the Theory of Career 
Mobility. Applied Economics 36(8): 803 – 816. 
Caliendo, M., F. Fossen and A. Kritikos. 2008. The Impact of Risk Attitudes on 
Entrepreneurial Survival. IZA Discussion Paper No. 3525. 
Caliendo, M., D. Cobb-Clark and A. Uhlendorff. 2010. Locus of Control and Job Search 
Strategies. IZA Discussion Paper No. 4750. 
Cappellari, L. and S. Jenkins. 2004. Modelling low income transitions. Journal of Applied 
Econometrics 19: 593-610 
Cappellari, L. and S. Jenkins. 2008. Transitions between unemployment and low pay. 
Research in Labour Economics 28: 57-79. 
Cappellari, L., R. Dorsett and G. Haile. 2010. State dependence and unobserved heterogeneity 
in the employment transitions of the over-50s. Empirical Economics 38(3): 523-554. 
Chevalier, A. 2003. Measuring mismatch. Economica 70: 509-531.   26
Costa, P. T. and R.R McCrae. 2002. Looking backward: Changes in the mean levels of 
personality traits from 80 to 12. In D. Cervone and W. Mischel (Eds.), Advances in 
personality science, New York: Guilford Press: 219–237. 
Dekker, R., A. de Grip and H. Heijke. 2002. The effects of training and overeducation on 
career mobility in a segmented labour market. International Journal of Manpower 23(2): 
106-125. 
Dohmen, T., A. Falk, D. Huffman and U. Sunde. 2009. Homo Reciprocans: Survey Evidence 
on Behavioural Outcomes. The Economic Journal 119(536): 592-612. 
Dolton, P. and A. Vignoles. 2000. The incidence and effects of overeducation in the U.K. 
graduate labor market. Economics of Education Review 19: 179–198. 
Frenette, M. 2004. The overqualified Canadian graduate: the role of the academic program in 
the incidence, persistence, and economic returns to overqualification. Economics of 
Education Review 23: 29–45. 
Gourieroux, C. and A. Monfort, A. 1996. Simulation based econometric methods, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Green, F., S. McIntosh and A. Vignoles. 2002. The utilization of education and skills: evidence 
from Great Britain. The Manchester School 70(6): 792–811. 
Groot, W. 1996. The incidence of, and returns to overqualification in the UK. Applied 
Economics 28: 1345-1350. 
Groot, W. and H. Maassen van den Brink. 1997. Allocation and the Returns to Over-
education in the UK. Education Economics 5(2): 169–183. 
Groot, W. and H. Maassen van den Brink. 2004. The dynamics of skill mismatches in the 
Dutch labour market. In Büchel, F., de Grip, A. and Mertens, A. (eds). Overeducation in 
Europe: Current Issues of Theory and Policy, Cheltenham, UK. Edward Elgar: 49-65. 
Ham, R., P.N. Junankar and R. Wells. 2009. Occupational Choice: Personality Matters. IZA 
Discussion Paper No. 4105. 
Heckman, J.J. 1981. The incidental parameters problem and the problem of initial conditions 
in estimating a discrete time-discrete data stochastic process. In C. F. Manski and D. 
McFadden (eds.), Structural Analysis of Discrete Data with Econometric Applications. 
Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.   27
Heckman, J.J., J. Stixrud and S. Urzua. 2006. The Effects of Cognitive and Noncognitive 
Abilities on Labor Market Outcomes and Social Behavior. Journal of Labor Economics 
24(3): 411-482. 
Heckman, J.J., J.E., Humphries, S. Urzua and G. Veramendi. 2010. The Effects of Schooling 
on Labor Market and Health Outcomes. Unpublished Manuscript. University of Chicago, 
Department of Economics. 
Heineck, G. and S. Anger. 2010. The returns to cognitive abilities and personality traits in 
Germany. Labour Economics 17(3): 535-546. 
Huber, P.J. 1967. The behavior of maximum likelihood estimators under non-standard 
conditions. In Proceedings of the Fifth Berkeley Symposium in Mathematical Statistics and 
Probability, University of California Press, Berkeley CA.  
Jovanovic, B. 1979. Job Matching and the Theory of Turnover, Journal of Political Economy 
87: 972-990. 
Judge, T.A., C. Higgins, C.J. Thoresen and M.R. Barrick. 1999. The Big Five personality traits, 
general mental ability, and career success across the life span. Personnel Psychology 52: 
621-652. 
Judge, T.A., D. Heller and M.K. Mount. 2002. Five-Factor model of personality and job 
satisfaction: A meta-analysis. Journal of Applied Psychology 87: 530-541. 
Judge, T.A., and A. Erez. 2007. Interaction and intersection: The constellation of emotional 
stability and extraversion in predicting performance. Personnel Psychology 60: 571-594. 
Kammeyer-Mueller, J.D., T.A. Judge and R.F. Piccolo. 2008. Self-esteem and extrinsic career 
success: Test of a dynamic model. Applied Psychology: An International Review 57: 204-
224. 
Leuven, E. and H. Oosterbeek. 2011. Overeducation and mismatch in the labor market. In E. 
Hanushek, S. Machin and L. Woessmann (eds.). Handbook of the Economics of Education. 
Elsevier. 
Lindley, J. and S. McIntosh. 2010. Is the Over-Education Wage Penalty Permanent? 
Technical report, University of Surrey DP 01/10. 
Lockwood, P. 2002, Could It Happen to You? Predicting the Impact of Downward 
Comparisons on the Self. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 82(3): 343-358. 
Mavromaras, K., S. McGuinness and Y.K. Fok. 2009. Overskilling dynamics and education 
pathways. IZA Discussion Paper No. 4321.   28
Mueller, G. and E. Plug. 2006. Estimating the effects of personality on male and female 
earnings. Industrial and Labor Relations Review 60(1): 3–22. 
Nyhus, E.K. and E. Pons. 2005. The effects of personality on earnings. Journal of Economic 
Psychology 26: 363–384. 
Roberts, B.W. and W.F. DelVecchio. 2000. The rank-order consistency of personality from 
childhood to old age: A quantitative review of longitudinal studies. Psychological Bulletin 
126: 3-25. 
Sattinger, M. 1993. Assignment Models of the Distribution of Earnings. Journal of Economic 
Literature 31: 831-880. 
Semykina, A and S. Linz. 2007. Gender differences in personality and earnings: Evidence 
from Russia. Journal of Economic Psychology 28(3): 387-410.  
Sicherman, N. 1991. Over-education in the Labor Market. Journal of Labor Economics 9(2): 
101-122. 
Stewart, M. and J. Swaffield. 1999. Low pay dynamics and transition probabilities. 
Economica 66: 23-42. 
Störmer, S. and R. Fahr. 2010. Individual Determinants of Work Attendance: Evidence on the 





















   29
Tables and Figures 
 



















Temporary contract 0.267 0.443
Self-employed 0.147 0.354
Woman 0.464 0.499
Years schooling 12.540 2.716
No. of adults 2.205 0.833












External LOC 3.545 0.878  30





Table 4. Estimates of model correlations, and model test statistics 
Correlation between unobservables affecting:  Estimate |t-ratio| 
Base year overeducation status and attrition       -0.0191 -1.39 
Base year overeducation and current overeducation status       0.6057 6.62 
Attrition and conditional overeducation      0.0369 0.41 
Null hypothesis for tests  Test statistic  p-value 
Exogeneity of initial conditions:          0   44.01 0.000 
Exogeneity of sample attrition:          0   2.31 0.316 
Joint exogeneity:               0   67.42 0.000 
Exclusion of relationship quality from overeducation transition (d.f.=24)  30.60  0.166 
Exclusion of sample membership from overeducation transition (d.f.=2)  3.04  0.218 
Exclusion of relationship quality and sample membership from  
overeducation transition (d.f.=26) 
32.46 0.178 
Inclusion of relationship quality in base year overeducation (d.f.=12)  22.37  0.034 









Overeducation status in period t-1 Overeducation status in period t
Non-overeducated Overeducated Missing





Non-overereducated 81.2 1.7 17.1
Overeducated 11.5 72.7 15.8
All 71.4 11.7 16.9  31
Table 5. Trivariate probit model estimation: probability of overeducation at t 
 
 Over-educated  a  t-1            Non over-educated at t-1 
Covariates (measured at t-1)      |t-ratio|           |t-ratio| 
Individual characteristics        
Woman -0.002  -0.03  -0.095  -2.41 
Ln (age)  -0.060  -0.04  0.286  0.19 
Ln (age
2) 0.010  0.05  -0.102  -0.47 
Ln (years education)  4.050  12.53  3.748  17.47 
Single -0.161  -2.26  0.041  0.75 
Divorced 0.086  0.95  -0.044  -0.61 
Bad health  -0.022  -0.30  -0.030  -0.49 
Conscientiousness -0.780  -1.77  -0.327  -1.44 
Neuroticism 0.186  0.43  0.267  1.17 
Extraversion -0.916  -2.18  -0.391  -1.67 
Agreeableness 0.210  0.51  0.110  0.50 
Openness 1.539  3.47  0.980  3.98 
External LOC  -0.761  -1.66  -1.265  -5.34 
Education * Conscientiousness  0.306  1.90  0.140  1.58 
Education * Neuroticism  -0.071  -0.45  -0.103  -1.16 
Education * Extraversion  0.329  2.13  0.150  1.65 
Education * Agreeableness  -0.065  -0.43  -0.035  -0.40 
Education * Openness  -0.587  -3.58  -0.369  -3.85 
Education * External LOC  0.332  1.96  0.511  5.45 
Household characteristics        
Ln (adults)  -0.155  -2.53  0.052  1.17 
Ln (children)  -0.017  -0.33  -0.010  -0.25 
Job characteristics         
Temporary -0.082  -1.29  0.123  2.70 
Self-employed -0.224  -3.58  -0.013  -0.25 
Ln (tenure)  0.221  3.79  0.028  0.59 
Ln (tenure
2) -0.084  -4.35  -0.051  -3.21 
        
No. of observations  71321 
Log-likelihood -46161.28 
Model chi-square (d.f=153)  18963.55 (p < 0.000) 
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Table 6. Aggregate and individual state dependence 
                |            1  
Raw aggregate probabilities of overeducation at t conditional on   
Overeducation at t-1 0.862 
Non overeducation at t-1 0.020 
Difference 0.842 
Model predicted probabilities:               |            1    
Average for the sample of overeducated at t-1  0.862     
Average for the sample of non over-educated at t-1  0.169     
Difference 0.694 
State Dependence  0.148 

















Mean Median Mean Median
Overeducated reference individual 0.892 0.538 0.833 9.26 6.06 1.86 0.90
Percentage points variation following:
 + 1 std in years of schooling 5.49 26.02 10.46 83.05 87.94 -20.65 -31.86
 + 1 std deviation in Conscientiousness -10.54 -31.04 -22.26 -46.53 -49.35 45.01 66.56
 + 1 std deviation in Neuroticism 0.90 5.02 2.02 8.00 8.47 -4.78 -7.23
 + 1 std deviation in Extraversion -13.90 -38.29 -29.32 -53.45 -56.70 62.05 91.39
 + 1 std deviation in Agreeableness 1.79 7.99 3.66 17.39 18.42 -7.40 -11.23
 + 1 std deviation in Openness 9.53 51.49 16.78 369.57 391.17 -33.99 -54.24
 + 1 std deviation in External LOC -3.48 -20.45 -9.36 -22.30 -23.63 25.70 38.23
 + 1 std deviation in schooling and Conscientiousness -2.02 -3.16 -3.31 -14.29 -15.14 3.26 4.91
 + 1 std deviation in schooling and Neuroticism 6.17 29.74 11.60 103.77 109.87 -22.92 -35.51
 + 1 std deviation in schooling and Extraversion -4.48 -10.97 -8.27 -27.03 -28.64 12.32 18.43
 + 1 std deviation in schooling and Agreeableness 6.61 32.53 12.35 120.41 127.48 -24.54 -38.14
 + 1 std deviation in schooling and Openness 11.10 65.61 18.87 1100.00 1164.16 -39.62 -65.16
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